FREE WILL AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Abstract

The article is devoted to the disclosure of key psychological aspects of the problem of free will. The representation of the problem of freedom of will in modern Ukrainian and foreign publications is analyzed. Today, free will is one of the most discussed problems in foreign publications on philosophy. The ancient philosophical debate “free will or determinism” is unfolding with new force in the field of neuroscience. The results of research in the fields of psychology, neurobiology, and physics have called into question traditional ideas about the existence of only conscious determinants of volitional behavior and the guiding role of consciousness in volitional processes. The extreme determinist position that free will is an illusion created by the brain is quite popular. At the same time, scientists indicate the need to study the reasons for people’s widespread and strong belief in free will, as well as the social significance of these beliefs. In modern psychology, the problem of free will raises a wide range of issues related to the conscious human activity, the generation and motivation of volitional actions. The theoretical understanding of the problem of will in psychology arose thanks to the philosophy of voluntarism. The problem of free will in psychological research appeared, first of all, as a problem of realizing free will in specific (usually difficult) conditions of purposeful human activity. The explanation of this complex process is connected with the development of the regulatory approach in the psychology of the will, which still remains the leading one. In Ukrainian psychology, the problem of free will is most closely related to behavioral, subject and situational approaches in the study of personality. Freedom of will acts as a necessary condition and way of human existence as a subject and subject activity. Research in the post-nonclassical scientific paradigm has proven the perspective of studying the situational context of subject activity, according to which free will appears, first of all, as freedom of choice.